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Summary 
Prior to the Asian crisis, benign liquidity conditions contributed to credit expansion and 
overinvestment in the East Asian economies until they were hit by a deep recession (Saxena 
and Wong 2002). Similarly to the developments in the tiger economies in the nineties, the 
CEE economies grew rapidly from 2001 to 2007, due to foreign capital inflows. But the 
current global financial turmoil and economic downswing also pulled the CEE economies 
into the maelstrom of the crisis. With the Asian experience in mind, the aim of this paper is to 
analyze whether overinvestment due to benign liquidity conditions possibly emerged and 
contributed to the crisis in CEE. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Prior to the Asian crisis of 1997/98, benign world liquidity conditions contributed to credit 
expansion and overinvestment2 in the East Asian economies until they were hit by a deep 
recession that revealed unsustainable investment projects (Saxena and Wong 2002). Similarly 
to the tiger economies in the 90s, the Central and Eastern European (CEE3) economies grew 
rapidly from 2001 to 2007. But the current global financial turmoil and economic downswing 
pulled the CEE economies into the maelstrom of the crisis. With the East Asian experience in 
mind, the main aim of this paper is to analyze whether easy outside (EMU) liquidity 
conditions possibly triggered a credit-induced overinvestment boom that culminated in the 
current crisis in CEE. 
 
A substantial number of papers focus on identifying how sudden liquidity shocks affect 
inflation and growth in small open economies. Therefore, several variations of Sims (1980)’s 
VAR methodology are applied throughout the literature (e.g. Mojon and Peersman 2003, 
Canova 2005 and Schneider and Fenz 2008). For CEE, for instance Arnostova and Hurnik 
(2004) find that changes in EMU liquidity conditions affect inflation in the Czech Republic. 
And Kuijs (2002) finds a quick response towards EMU liquidity shocks on prices in Slovakia. 
 
Although previous research shows that liquidity shocks affect inflation and growth in CEE, it 
does not come up with an explanation of how benign liquidity conditions can build up a crisis 
potential during the boom period. To explain the emergence of a crisis, most current research 
assumes that an exogenous shock changes aggregate supply, demand or liquidity conditions. 
Then, the rational and fully informed agents adjust to the new situation. The assumption of 
price stickiness allows for an adjustment period that is interpreted as a business cycle (De 
Grauwe 2008, Lombari and Sgherri 2007). 
 
In contrast, Hayek (1929) and Mises (1912) argue that exuberated credit growth causes an 
overinvestment boom that endogenously leads to a bust (in a closed economy). The reasons 
for buoyant credit growth are irrational behavior and benign liquidity conditions of the 
banking sector.4 Robbins (1934) most prominently applies their theory to explain the causes 
                                                 
2 Mal- or overinvestment labels investment projects that seem to pay-off (due to ignoring risks or excessive 
lending), but eventually do not pay-off. 
3 In this paper the new member states of the European Union, except of Cyprus and Malta, are denoted as CEE. 
4 Several other theories depart from rational expectations and full information assumptions to explain business 
cycles, but without particular emphasis on the importance of the credit conditions. They explain overinvestment 
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of the Great Depression. Furthermore, Eichengreen and Mitchener (2003) use quantitative 
tools to find evidence of whether a credit boom contributed to the Great Depression, 
approving the main arguments of the Mises-Hayek theory.  
 
For (small) open economies, White (2006) argues that the credit boom explanation of the 
business cycle may even be more applicable, as capital in- and outflows can bring about 
booms driven by foreign credit. Also, McKinnon and Pill (1997) explain that buoyant foreign 
borrowing may cause overinvestment in small open economies. In this sense, Krugman 
(1998) and Corsetti et al. (1999) find overinvestment and over-borrowing (due to moral 
hazard of banks) to be causes of the East Asian crisis. And more recently, Schnabl and 
Hoffmann (2008) and McKinnon and Schnabl (2009a) argue that easy liquidity conditions 
after 2001 contributed to investment booms around the world, especially in small open 
economies. 
 
As the aim of this paper is to analyze whether easy (EMU) liquidity conditions triggered a 
credit-induced boom-and-bust cycle in CEE, it is necessary to understand how 
overinvestment can emerge due to benign credit conditions. Therefore, the paper starts with 
an introduction of the overinvestment theory of Mises (1912) and Hayek (1929) (section 2). 
Then, augmenting the overinvestment theory to a small open economy framework shall help 
with understanding possible causes of buoyant credit growth and overinvestment in the small 
open economies of CEE. Section 4 provides an analysis of whether easy EMU liquidity 
conditions transferred to CEE and caused a credit boom that culminated in the current crises. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
by “animal spirits” (Keynes), herding and self-fulfilling prophecies (see Akerlof and Shiller (2009), Shiller 
(2000), De Grauwe (2008) and Minsky (1982)). 
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2 Overinvestment in closed economies 
2.1 The Mises-Hayek overinvestment theory 
 
The overinvestment theories of Ludwig von Mises (1912) and Friedrich August von Hayek 
(1929, 1934) explain overinvestment and crisis due to positive expectations and benign 
liquidity conditions in a closed (advanced) economy framework. 
 
Assumptions and causes of the business cycle 
 
Building upon Wicksell (1898) and Schumpeter (1912), Mises and Hayek base their 
overinvestment theories on the distinction between three types of interest rates: First, the 
“internal interest rate”, reflecting the expected return of investment projects. Second, the 
“natural interest rate”, equivalent to an equilibrium interest rate which balances supply 
(saving) and demand (investment) on capital markets. Third, the “the money market rate” 
which is set by the banking sector. In equilibrium, the natural rate of interest is equal to the 
money market rate. Then, the capital and the goods market are in equilibrium as well. 
 
According to Mises and Hayek, boom-and-bust cycles along the long-term equilibrium path 
are initiated by buoyant credit expansions that lead to overinvestment. There are two reasons 
for excessive credit expansion:  
 
(1) easy credit conditions  
(2) positive expectations (innovations) (Hayek 1976 [1929]: 99).  
 
In the first point, Mises and Hayek follow Wicksell (1898), who introduces the idea of a 
money market rate fluctuating around an equilibrium interest rate (natural rate of interest), 
which is defined as the interest rate where savings match investment. As in Wicksell’s (1898) 
framework, the banking sector has to hold market rates equal to the natural rate of interest to 
keep the economy in equilibrium. Whereas, if the banking sector holds market rates below the 
“natural rate”, investors are able to get more credit as capital is relatively cheap. This induces 
an investment boom and causes wage growth that eventually leads to inflation. 
 
In the second point, Mises and Hayek follow Schumpeter’s concept of “new combinations” 
(i.e. innovations) as a possible cause of positive expectations (Hayek, 1929; and Hayek, 1976: 
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95). According to Schumpeter, an innovation is the result of competition, where “dynamic 
entrepreneurs” try to create an advantage over the other market participants to achieve higher 
profits. An innovation can be the implementation of a new production process, a new product, 
access to new supply and demand markets or a new organisational structure (Schumpeter 
1912: 100-103). Other market participants soon realize the gains from this innovation and 
adopt it. Then profits shrink again and a new equilibrium at a higher level is achieved 
(Schumpeter 1928: 36). As technological changes or access to new markets brings about 
higher returns (internal interest rates) and more output, they are not a reason for an 
unsustainable boom. But they can initiate irrational credit demand when expectations for 
future profits are over-optimistic due to imperfect information.5 
 
The upswing 
 
The boom may start, with a rise in capital demand due to positive expectations about future 
income (internal interest rate rises). Then the “natural rate of interest” increases as capital 
supply (which is equal to savings) remains constant. If banks provide credit at an unchanged 
money market rate, the money market rate falls below the “natural rate.” Hayek and Mises 
argue that banks have the tendency to expand credit too far at unchanged rates, due to 
competition for the greatest market share (Mises 1912: 409, 417, 420, 428, 430 und Hayek 
1976 [1929]: 99).6 This is often referred to as the “perverse elasticity of the banking sector.”7  
 
If a central bank increases interest rates following a rise in capital demand, this slows down 
the credit expansion as it restricts the liquidity conditions for banks. Therefore they increase 
the money market rate. But assuming the central bank keeps liquidity conditions unchanged 
in this situation8, commercial banks can keep the interest rates unchanged and directly 
transfer the loose liquidity conditions to the private sector (Hayek 1976 [1929]: 99-103; 
                                                 
5 This point was also stressed by Robert Shiller (2000) in “Irrational Exuberance” and recently by George 
Akerlof and Robert Shiller (2009) in “Animal Spirits”. They argue that psychology, herding and irrational 
expectations lead to speculation, overinvestment and crisis. Similarly Minsky´s (1982) financial instability 
hypothesis argues that positive expectations drive the upswing. 
6 Rotemberg and Saloner (1987) found that oligopolistic competition provides incentives to not adjust prices 
straight away and may provide a theoretical model for this behavior. 
7 Also Minsky (1982) argues that the credit system exceeds credit lines too far. His finance scheme can be seen 
as a further explanation of the possible excesses during the boom. 
8 This may be due to imperfect information or irrational expectations about future output. Furthermore Mises 
and Hayek often argue that central banks want to initiate an upswing via artificially lowering interest rates to 
enhance credit growth, investment and reduce unemployment during the recession. Under such conditions, 
lowering interest rates, although savings have not increased, can contribute to an artificial upswing that faces the 
same problem as a monetary policy mistake. Inflation will set in as preferences of households have not changed 
from consumption towards savings beforehand (see e.g. Mises 1928). 
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Mises 1912: 417-430). Furthermore, new financial instruments may allow for more lending at 
unchanged rates, if this is not restricted. Thus, if supervision is not sufficient, for instance due 
to a lack of information, monetary policy may lose control over liquidity conditions and 
banks can satisfy any credit demand at unchanged rates. 
 
If the banking sector holds money market rates below the natural rate, investment that would 
not be profitable under “equilibrium interest rates” is undertaken (Böhm-Bawerk 1884: 400, 
Mises 1912: 429). Building upon Böhm-Bawerk’s capital theory (1884, 1923), Hayek (1967 
[1934]) argues that money market rates which are below the natural rate change the 
investment structure in an economy. A lower money market rate implies that households and 
firms save a larger share (capital supply is high) and consume fewer of their income than they 
actually do. Therefore lower money market rates bring about relatively more “roundabout 
ways of production” and thus more capital goods than consumer goods. As the production 
becomes more capital intensive, the capital stock of an economy grows. 
 
Increased investment in capital goods goes along with higher wages. As the amount of 
consumer goods does not increase and preferences of consumers do not change towards 
savings, higher wages lead to overconsumption and bring about rising consumer prices 
(Mises 1912, 430, 431) to close the inflationary gap that comes along with an investment 
overhang. Mises argues that this is equivalent to forced savings or wealth redistribution from 
workers (who intended to save a small amount of their income) towards investors (who save 
more) (Garrison 2004). Therefore the boom is characterized by overinvestment and 
overconsumption (Garrison 2006: 72). 
 
The positive economic expectations can be transmitted to the asset markets where speculation 
may set in. This may be the case if households start buying stocks of the booming enterprises 
from the additional income to profit from the boom, instead of (forced) saving at lower 
interest rates. Then, consumer prices may not immediately increase. According to 
Schumpeter (1983 [1912]: 237) price expectations of stocks and other real assets can depart 
from the real economic development. A speculative mania may emerge, in which speculative 
price projections and “the symptoms of prosperity themselves finally become, in the well 
known manner, a factor of prosperity” (Schumpeter 1983 [1912]: 226).  
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The turnaround and downswing 
 
But when inflation accelerates and central banks start to increase interest rates, the turnaround 
is inevitable. Then, the banking sector does not renew credit lines and reassesses the risk 
(Hayek 1976 [1929]: 101). The rising money market rate lifts the threshold for the 
profitability of all previous investment projects. Especially the production of capital goods is 
not profitable anymore. This dismantles investment projects with an internal interest rate 
below the risen money market rate. As the demand for capital declines during the recession, 
the natural interest rate falls. 
 
Due to higher money market rates and negative expectations, investors start few new 
investment projects. On the other hand, more and more investment projects become 
unprofitable with general demand declining (negative multiplication effect). The capital stock 
of the economy shrinks. A recession follows which will be the deeper the larger the 
“exuberance” has been. Previous overconsumption turns into abstinence of consumption as 
the losses due to mal-investment have to be digested. The price level falls, especially in 
markets that have seen overinvestment and -consumption. In the last stage of the bust, when 
overinvestment has been dismantled and the misallocated production factors have been 
released, prospects for investors become better: First, the central bank can ease its liquidity 
conditions due to the falling inflation rate and capital demand and banks can provide credit 
more easily. Second, the demand for capital increases until the economy is in equilibrium 
again. 
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2.2 Implications 
 
The structural adjustment after the turnaround is a necessary prerequisite for the recovery 
after the slump. According to Mises and Hayek the “crisis will heal the market” (Mises 1912: 
431) as it separates profitable investment projects (with high internal interest rates) from 
investment projects with low profitability (low internal interest rates). In a crisis, market 
participants restore the disequilibrating effects of an expansionary credit policy to 
equilibrium. This implies the existence of an internal impulse towards equilibrium (Rizzo 
1990). 
 
Without such a cumbersome process, investment projects with low internal interest rate 
would be maintained, the necessary restructuring would be postponed, and the following 
upswing would not be sustainable. As further credit expansions during a crisis can delay the 
tendency to equilibrium, Mises and Hayek do not see them as useful tools against a crisis. 
Therefore, the economic policy implication for central banks is to hold market rates close to 
the “natural rate of interest” and closely watch the liquidity conditions of the banking sector 
to safeguard the economy against volatility and severe crisis, because the longer market and 
natural rates differ, the bigger the catastrophe (Mises 1912, 436). 
 
However this does not solve the problem of the business cycle as a whole, because due to the 
“perverse elasticity of the banking sector”, banks always tend to increase credit lines too far 
(capital supply) and thereby cause overinvestment. But holding interest rates close to 
equilibrium and supervising the banking sector smoothens the cycle (Hayek 1929) around the 
long-term growth path. 
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3 Overinvestment in small open economies 
 
Mises (1912) and Hayek (1929) explain how the domestic banking sector can cause excessive 
credit growth and overinvestment in a closed economy. In this part, introducing more recent 
research shall help with explaining the causes of buoyant credit growth and overinvestment in 
a small open economy largely depending on foreign credit under consideration of the 
exchange rate regime.  
 
 
3.1 Foreign credit and overinvestment 
 
Foreign credit and growth 
 
With closed capital markets, entrepreneurs can only raise money from domestic banks. In this 
context underdeveloped financial markets in emerging market economies are by definition 
characterized by high interest rates and risk (original sin) (Eichengreen and Hausmann 1999). 
Therefore the expected return of planned investment projects has to be high to be realized. 
According to overinvestment theories of Mises and Hayek the investment activity is sluggish 
in this scenario.9 
 
Free access to international capital markets lowers money market rates and thereby 
accelerates investment and growth (McKinnon 1997). In this scenario, lower interest rates 
from abroad can boost investment. Low world interest rates promote investment in the 
domestic market because they are tantamount to lower costs of investment, as investors can 
use foreign savings to finance projects in the domestic market. Due to capital inflows the 
interest rate level converges towards the international level (plus a risk premium). According 
to Mises and Hayek this drop in interest rates must initiate an upswing.  
 
Figure 1 explains the effects of opening capital markets for instance for the CEE economies. 
It shows that after opening capital markets world liquidity conditions, especially EMU 
interest rates, affect investment decisions in CEE. When borrowing from abroad capital 
supply in CEE increases as foreign savings become available via capital imports. On the other 
                                                 
9 The CEE economies faced an even greater problem. They had no market economy, needed to accumulate 
capital (Böhm-Bawerk 1884). 
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hand, as the CEEC are relatively small, they do not affect capital supply in the EMU. Thus, 
capital inflows lower interest rates in CEE. Investment projects in CEE can be financed with 
capital at the cost of imEU (plus a risk premium). The investment activity increases. The catch-
up process starts. 
 
[Figure 1]10 
 
This is equivalent to a drop of interest rates in the closed economy framework of Hayek and 
Mises, which allows for additional investment. Similarly to a credit expansion of banks in a 
closed economy, the interest rate drop will bring about lower saving preferences and higher 
consumption preferences of households. As in a small open economy where goods are 
available via imports, the current account balance turns negative. In this case, households 
borrow against future income (McKinnon and Pill 1997). But because the capital stock of 
economies in the catch-up process grows, the marginal rate of capital declines and the 
economic growth rates converge towards the level of the advanced economy. Thus the natural 
rate declines as well.  
 
Due to higher production and income, investors are able to repay foreign credit lines in the 
future unless malinvestment is made. Thus, the short-term drop in savings is not troublesome. 
The current account deficit rather reflects an intertemporally efficient allocation of resources 
(McKinnon and Pill 1997), bringing about higher production, wages and savings in later 
periods. Hence, getting rid of financial repression (McKinnon and Shaw 1973) and opening 
capital markets (McKinnon 1997, McKinnon and Pill 1997) increase investment and growth. 
 
Foreign credit and overinvestment 
 
Overinvestment in a small open economy is likely to emerge if world interest rates are “too 
low” (below their natural rate). Central banks may contribute to this by holding interest rates 
too low. Further, they may lose control over liquidity conditions due to credit creation of the 
banking sector that is (widely) independent from the money supply of central banks. Then 
capital flows can transfer benign world liquidity conditions to a small open economy via 
foreign credit and bring about boom-and-bust cycles along the long-term growth path 
(Schnabl and Hoffmann 2008) as outlined by Mises and Hayek for a closed economy.  
                                                 
10 See Appendix A 
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Overinvestment driven by buoyant capital inflows is most likely if positive expectations 
about the future income (high expected internal interest rates) in the small open economy lead 
to exuberate lending by banks or the volatility risk of the small economy is neglected (Saxena 
and Wong 2002). Moral hazard may signal lenders too high pay-offs and lead them to finance 
investment projects that are not lucrative under rational expectations (McKinnon and Pill 
1997). This causes over-borrowing of households and investors, increases consumption and 
decreases savings below a point that is sustainable. Then the economy faces overinvestment, 
overconsumption and unsustainable current account deficits. Therefore opening capital 
markets and allowing for capital in- and outflows increases investment and growth, but also 
the possibility of credit cycles as outlined by Mises and Hayek (White 2006).  
 
For instance in the 1990s, over-optimism about the future growth-path and false fiscal policy 
were incentives for neglecting the volatility risk and for rising credit demand in East Asia. 
The availability of cheap U.S. and Asian monies allowed for exuberate credit growth and 
over-borrowing (Saxena and Wong 2002). In the mean time, central banks implicitly 
guaranteed the banks to act as a lender of last resort in case of default and crisis. Therefore 
banks ignored risks of default because they believed that possible losses would be covered by 
an insurance system (Krugman 1998, Corsetti et al. 1999). Thus an artificially lowered risk 
premium further reduced the costs of capital for investors, and overinvestment emerged.11  
 
Similarly, the Federal Reserve provided low cost liquidity as it kept interest rates “too low for 
too long” after the burst of the dot-com bubble in 2001, contributing to excessive borrowing 
and the US housing market bubble (Taylor 2008, Lombari and Sgherri 2007). The Fed’s 
overreaction accompanied by loose regulation further led to dollar carry trades to markets 
around the world, especially in 2005 and 2006 (McKinnon and Schnabl 2009a) and translated 
to monetary expansion worldwide. Especially countries that pegged their currencies to the 
dollar experienced foreign reserve growth, and thus monetary expansion. But also the ECB 
that tried to prevent the euro from appreciating too much, reluctantly followed the US 
monetary expansion until 2006 (Belke and Polleit 2006, Hoffmann 2009). 
 
Additionally, new unregulated financial products (derivatives) seemed to allow for unlimited 
credit creation at unchanged rates as banks could pass on the risks of investment via AAA 
                                                 
11 This is caused by “too big to fail” policies of central banks in case of default Other implicit insurance systems 
are IMF bail-outs.  
 
 12
rated derivatives to investors worldwide. Thus, the investment activity further increased and 
lifted the natural rate above the respective money market rate. This can be interpreted as signs 
of the “perverse elasticity of the banking sector.” With central banks losing control over 
liquidity conditions, global excess liquidity after 2001 led to credit growth, inflation and real 
estate booms in several markets (Belke et al. 2008). This contributed to hiking asset prices 
around the world (Borio 2008), in particular in new and emerging markets as additional 
liquidity is likely to “vagabond” to the high-yielding markets (Schnabl and Hoffmann 2008). 
 
 
3.2 Overinvestment with respect to the exchange rate framework 
 
The emergence of overinvestment cycles due to speculative capital inflows depends on the 
exchange rate regime of the small open economy.  Under both, fixed and flexible exchange 
rate regimes, overinvestment cycles can emerge, although causes and transmission differ. 
 
Fixed exchange rates may attract speculative capital inflows as the exchange rate risk seems 
to diminish (Fischer 2001). Without this risk foreign borrowing only depends on the interest 
rate differential with the anchor economy. Thus, capital flows to countries with fixed 
exchange rates should increase their exchange reserves as well as stock and real estate prices. 
Overinvestment can emerge if banks borrow money denominated in foreign currency to give 
it to the domestic investors, without consideration of the exchange rate risk. According to 
Herzberg and Watson (2007) hard pegs “accelerate the expansion of un-hedged borrowing in 
foreign currencies.” Thus, banks have incentives to expand credit lines too far as in the closed 
economy framework of Mises and Hayek. Maturity mismatches enhance the danger of 
overinvestment.  This was the case in the run-up to the Asian crisis.  
 
Further, in currency board arrangements, monetary expansions of the anchor economy 
directly transfer into monetary expansions in the anchoring economy. Therefore, an 
asymmetric shock in an anchor economy can bring about an overinvestment boom in small 
open economies with a currency board. If the small open economy is in a boom and the 
anchor economy experiences a cyclical downturn, the optimal money market rate (natural 
rate) in the small economy will be higher than in the anchor economy. This can fuel the boom 
in the small economy and bring about investment that only pays-off until interest rates in the 
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anchor economy start to increase. But if business cycles are highly synchronized, as in the 
case of CEE and the euro area (Fidrmuc and Korhonen 2006), this scenario is rather unlikely. 
  
On the other hand, flexible exchange rates can attract speculative capital due to “one-way 
bets” on appreciation, especially in economies that are in the process of catching-up 
(McKinnon and Schnabl 2009b). “One-way bets” on appreciation may also endanger price 
stability in volatile small open economies (Merza 2004). Furthermore, if banks know that the 
domestic currency appreciates due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect, they may borrow in the 
currency of the anchor economy and convert it into the domestic currency. When the 
domestic currency appreciates, the value of foreign liabilities declines (in terms of domestic 
currency). In this situation, the central bank faces the revaluation loss and allows for more 
speculative investment and consumption of the private sector (Schnabl 2008a). Herding 
behavior can make appreciation expectations reinforcing and bring about a highly overvalued 
currency (Schnabl 2008a). In periods of contraction this effect is well-known. During the 
Asian crisis 1997/98 investors expected a strong depreciation and withdrew capital. 
 
As in both exchange rate strategies, volatility of the economy increases with the amount of 
capital attracted. Most emerging market economies intervene in the foreign exchange market 
and accumulate reserves to safeguard the economic stability, even though they announce the 
exchange rates to be flexible (Schnabl 2008a). When reserves are accumulated, speculative 
capital inflows translate into additional monetary expansions. Thus, the money market rates 
fall below the natural rate. Following Hayek and Mises the monetary expansion eases credit 
conditions for the banking sector and translates into additional credit to the private sector, due 
to the competition among banks. The credit boom is characterized by falling interest rates and 
a rising number of low-yielding investment projects. 
 
In both cases imports increase relative to export. On the one hand, exuberate capital inflows 
to economies that peg their currency to an advanced economy translate into higher wages and 
inflation (Schnabl and Ziegler 2008), improving the purchasing power of consumers in the 
small open economy. On the other hand, under a flexible exchange rate regime, the 
purchasing power increases relatively as the domestic currency appreciates. Both 
transmission channels lead to an appreciation of real exchange rates (De Grauwe and Schnabl 
2005). As in the theory of Hayek and Mises, savings are unlikely to increase with declining 
interest rates. Therefore the wealth effect from overinvestment contributes to higher 
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consumption and increases imports as they become relatively cheaper. Thus, in both cases, 
imports tend to increase relative to exports due to the capital inflows into the economy. 
Overinvestment is followed by overconsumption. 
 
 
4 Benign liquidity conditons and overinvestment cycles in CEE 
 
In this section, an empirical analysis shall provide evidence of whether easy liquidity 
conditions in the EMU affected liquidity conditions in CEE as suggested in section 3. 
Furthermore, it is elaborated, whether a credit-induced overinvestment boom possibly 
emerged due to a divergence of the money market from the natural rate that led to the current 
crisis in CEE (in the sense of the augmented Mises-Hayek theory). 
 
4.1 Impact of easy EMU liquidity conditions on CEE 
 
Foreign capital inflows and liquidity conditions in CEE 
 
Opening capital markets brought about capital inflows to CEE due to two reasons: First, 
positive growth expectations attracted FDI as well as portfolio investment from international 
investors financed at the cost of low world interest rates. Second, as most banks in CEE are 
foreign owned, they were considered to be safe lenders. For instance in Estonia, Swedish 
banks dominate the banking sector. Similarly, Austrian banks play a significant role in 
Hungary. This domination of western subsidiaries and foreign owned banks raised the 
credibility of the financial sector and allowed for an easy access to international capital 
(Ehrlich et al. 2002, Sepp and Randveer 2002). Both, FDI and foreign owned banks seemed 
to provide an insurance against financial instability.  
 
Foreign borrowing of banks increased in CEE, because the interest rate spread between the 
euro area and CEE was high (Figure 2 and 3). This was especially the case after 2002 when 
world interest rates were abnormally low (Taylor 2008, Lombari and Sgherri 2007) and CEE 
improved its macroeconomic stability as a prerequisite for EU accession. Foreign borrowing 
brought about falling lending rates and a dependency on foreign credit. The banking sector 
passed on the currency risk from borrowing in euro to the private sector. The capital inflows 
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squeezed the spread between deposit and lending rates in CEE close to the spread in the euro 
area (Figure 4). This provided an incentive to take higher risks to both borrowers and lenders. 
 
Although the exchange rate risk adds to the risk premium, the falling lending-loan rate 
spreads (that can be seen as measures of risk) reflect that investors neglected this risk as EU 
membership and guaranteed euro adoption seemed to make depreciations unlikely. The 
exclusion of the risk further lowered loan rates. Therefore, especially in countries with 
exchange rate pegs, interest rates converged towards the EMU level (Figure 2) In Estonia the 
interest rate differential to the euro area was close to zero after 2004. In Poland the 
differential disappeared after joining the EU. The increases of the share of banks’ foreign 
liabilities after 2003 reflect this interest rate convergence (Figure 3). This provides evidence 
of a transmission of EMU liquidity conditions and interest rates to the small open economies 
in CEE. 
 
[Figure 2] [Figure 3] [Figure 4]12 
 
Transmission of benign liquidity conditions in the EMU to CEE 
 
Granger causality tests can help with finding evidence of a transmission of benign liquidity 
conditions from the EMU to CEE (Granger 1969). Following the augmented overinvestment 
framework, easy liquidity conditions are a deviation of the real money market rate from the 
natural rate. Therefore, the null hypothesis of the Granger causality test is that the deviation 
of the real money market rate from the natural rate in the EMU does not Granger Cause the 
deviation in the NMS. If the test rejects the null, this provides evidence of a transmission. The 
Schwartz criterion is used to select the correct lag length for the Granger causality test. 
 
For the analysis, monthly data is taken from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF 
provided by the Reuters EcoWin database. The data set starts in 1998 as before data is not 
completely available and the countries were in the transition from a socialist to a market 
economy. The data includes money market rates, consumer price inflation and industrial 
production for the NMS and the EMU, respectively. Industrial production replaces GDP 
because GDP aggregates are not available on monthly basis. Quarterly data would only allow 
a regression of 40 observations (10 years) and not provide a sufficient sample size. 
                                                 
12 See Appendix A. 
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Furthermore using quarterly data means a further aggregation and a loss of information. As 
industrial production is very sensitive to the business cycle and highly correlated with GDP, 
the data should be sufficient for the estimations. 
 
The real money market rate is calculated by subtracting consumer price inflation from the 
money market rate for each economy. Most commonly, the natural rate of interest is seen as a 
long-term real growth trend of GDP (HP filter). This is a derivation from the Ramsey model 
where the equilibrium interest rate is equal to the rate of technological progress, and thereby 
equal to the rate of long-term growth. Therefore in this paper the natural rate is the trend of 
real growth (industrial production).13 Thus, the deviation from the natural rate is equal to real 
growth trend minus the real interest rate. The HP filter with a lambda of 14400 is applied to 
calculate the trend using monthly data. The deviation from the trend is further labelled as 
“gap”. At the 10 percent significance level, the Dickey-Fuller test does not identify unit roots 
in the calculated gaps. 
 
The Granger causality test approves that the gap in the EMU Granger causes the gaps in 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia as it rejects the null of 
no causality. Past values of the gap between the money market and the natural rate in the 
EMU explain the gaps in these countries. In Latvia and Lithuania, this is only true for the 
sample starting after 2001. As before 2002 these countries pegged their currencies to the 
dollar or a basket of currencies, this finding reflects the switch in the exchange rate regime to 
pegging to the euro (Table 1). Therefore easy liquidity conditions from the EMU, as defined 
here, transferred to these CEE economies. 
 
In contrast, the EMU gap does not Granger cause the gaps in Slovakia and Romania. This is 
surprising as both countries have had only partly flexible (RO, SK) exchange rate regimes. 
Therefore it seems interesting whether EMU money market rates Granger cause money 
market rates at all. In Slovakia, the null of no Granger causality is only rejected if more lags 
(following the Akaike criterion) are included. However this is not the case for Romania, other 
factors (for instance the domestic banking sector) drive the money market rates in Romania.  
 
                                                 
13 There are several ways to calculate the natural rate of interest (Williams 2003). For instance, the long-term 
average real rate is a proxy of the natural rate. Also the Kalman filter may help to calculate the natural rate. The 
proxy in use brought about the same results as the trend of long-term interest rates (government bond yield). As 
long-term rates were not available for all countries, the proxy was not chosen for explanation. 
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[Table 1] [Table 2]14 
 
4.2 Possible signs of an overinvestment cycle 
 
The credit boom? 
 
Capital inflows and increased foreign borrowing of banks went along with high growth in 
output, credit growth and current account deficits in CEE, especially in the economies with 
exchange rate pegs. Figure 5 shows that in the CEE economies credit to the private sector as 
share of all assets has increased strongly after 2002. Further, the credit-deposit ratios of banks 
in 2007 are high above their past averages, especially in the Baltics, Romania and Bulgaria 
(Figure 6), which can be seen as a financial deepening indicator but also as a sign of more 
risk-taking by banks (Beck et al. 2000). Similarly, credit to the private sector as percent of 
GDP increased especially in countries with pegs to the euro (Figure 7). 
 
[Figure 5] [Figure 6] [Figure 7]15 
 
Following the augmented overinvestment framework, these are the typical ingredients of a 
credit-induced overinvestment boom. Accordingly, a substantial number of studies stressed 
the danger of excessive credit growth and overheating for stability in the CEEC prior to the 
current crisis. (Egert and Backe 2006, Sopanha 2006, Duenwald et al. 2005, Mendoza and 
Terrones 2004, Sopanha 2006, Hoffmann and Schnabl 2007, Bini-Smaghi 2007, Schnabl 
2008b). 
 
However, there is a broad consensus that credit booms are hard to spot before the event of the 
crisis, because high growth rates of output and credit to the private sector may also be 
justified by financial deepening (Beck et al. 2000), new technology, institutional change (as 
explained by Hayek and Schumpeter) or - as in the case of CEE - the accession to the EU and 
the expectation of euro adoption. Thus, excessive credit growth itself does not provide ex ante 
evidence of a credit boom (Eichengreen and Mitchener 2003, 15), even though loose credit 
conditions and credit growth are prerequisites of a credit boom. Thus, Eichengreen and 
Mitchener (2003) use three measures for an ex post quantitative analysis of whether an 
                                                 
14 See Appendix A. 
15 See Appendix B. 
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overinvestment may have occurred prior to the Great Depression: 1. the development of asset 
prices, 2. the investment/GDP, and 3. the money/GDP ratio. These indicators are analyzed in 
the following: 
 
First, Figure 8 shows that share prices (broad index from the IMF statistics) increased in all 
CEE economies especially after 2001 when credit growth increased and interest rates were 
low. In Figure 8 the development in Poland, Estonia and Romania is shown as representatives 
for the different exchange rate strategies. Since 2007 share prices have been falling sharply. 
The share price index follows the Eichengreen-Mitchener scheme for a credit boom. 
 
[Figure 8]16 
 
Second, the development of the investment/GDP ratio is illustrated in Figure 9 using data of 
quarterly capital formation. Figure 9 indicates an increase of this ratio up to 2007 in Bulgaria, 
Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia. In the Slovak Republic, Czech Republic 
and Poland this cannot be found, even though the investment/GDP share increased after 2004 
in accordance with the interest rate convergence. Hungary, troubled by instability did not see 
increases in the investment/GDP ratio, although share prices in Hungary have a similar trend 
to those in the other CEE economies. As increases in credit and investment were most 
pronounced among countries with tight pegs to the euro, e.g. the Baltic States, Bulgaria and 
Slovenia (Figure 7, 8 and 9), exchange rate pegs contributed to higher investment and growth 
rates in CEE countries from 1994 to 2007 (Hoffmann and Schnabl 2009, Schnabl 2008b).  
 
[Figure 9]17 
 
Following Eichengreen and Mitchener (2003) a rising money/GDP ratio is the third indicator 
for an overinvestment boom in the sense of the Mises-Hayek theory. Figure 10 illustrated that 
the money/GDP share increased in all CEE economies during the boom. Especially from 
2003-2007 the money/GDP share grew rapidly as capital inflows caused a fast accumulation 
of reserves in all CEE economies (that translated into additional monetary expansions). 
Figure 11 shows that countries with more flexible exchange rates did not stay behind 
exchange rate stabilizers in accumulating reserves. Countries with de jure intermediate 
exchange rate regimes like Romania and Slovakia even experienced the fastest reserve 
                                                 
16 See Appendix B. 
17 See Appendix B. 
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accumulation. In accordance with the reserve accumulation, real appreciation accelerated in 
all new member states. Figure 12 indicates that there was no difference between the countries 
with flexible and fixed exchange rates. Although nominally the exchange rate was stable, for 
instance in Estonia, capital inflows led to wage and (asset) price increases, which appreciated 
the currency in real terms during the boom period. 
 
 [Figure 10] [Figure 11] [Figure 12]18 
 
The construction of a composite indicator of the three credit boom indicators may provide 
evidence of an interrelation of the credit boom indicators (Eichengreen and Mitchener 2003; 
Borio and Lowe 2002). Therefore the deviation of the money/GDP and investment/GDP 
ratios as well as of the development of share prices (growth) from their HP trend are added 
with equal weights for the average share prices growth, money/GDP and investment/GDP 
ratios in CEE. Figure 13 indicates that after 2005, the composite indicator signals a credit 
boom. Figure 14 shows the development of each indicator separately. As share prices seem to 
fluctuate heavily, even though they provide the same notion, the composite indicator without 
shares is constructed as well. The indicator widely remains unchanged. This provides ex post 
evidence in favor of the strand of literature that warned from overheating pressure in CEE due 
to credit booms since 2005, such as Egert and Backe (2006), Sopanha (2006), Duenwald et al. 
(2005), Mendoza and Terrones (2004) and Hoffmann and Schnabl (2007). 
 
[Figure 13] [Figure 14]19 
 
The turn-around and downswing 
 
According to the overinvestment theory, the pick up of inflation is the first indicator for 
overheating pressures (Figure 15) and brings about the turn-around. Similarly in CEE, the 
increase in inflation was followed by a bust. While until 2004 countries with fixed exchange 
rates outperformed countries with flexible exchange rates, inflation increased in these 
countries from 2005 to 2007. At the same time inflation in the euro area increased. This 
dampened the macroeconomic outlook and thereby the stability of the markets, especially 
after the ECB started to raise interest rates due to inflationary pressure in 2006. Then asset 
prices and credit growth stagnated. This provides evidence in favor of an unsustainable credit 
                                                 
18 See Appendix B. 
19 See Appendix B. 
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boom. 
 
 [Figure 15]20 
 
Additionally, the emergence of the crisis in the US in 2007 and its transmission to Europe led 
to higher interest rates and falling output as investors invest less in emerging markets when 
they need liquidity in the safe havens. Due to fewer capital inflows the CEE economies faced 
a strong depreciation pressure. Therefore, the risk premium for investment projects increased 
dramatically. Thus, the lending-deposit rate spread increased from 2007 to early 2009. The 
inclusion of the risk raised costs of investment (volatility and exchange rate risk). Interest 
rates increased (Figure 2). Therefore many investment projects that seemed profitable before 
were not sustainable anymore. The investment activity stagnated and asset prices fell. (Figure 
8). 
 
Because less capital is available at higher costs, the countries in CEE see a strong contraction 
and real depreciation in the current crisis. In countries with fixed exchange rates, wages have 
to decline to keep up competitiveness. For instance in Estonia, where wages are relatively 
flexible, a wages cut is expected for 2009. Countries with rather floating exchange rates like 
Poland depreciated strongly to adjust to the new situation. In this case, repaying credit lines 
denominated in euro becomes more expensive. Up to now, the crisis has hit Latvia and 
Hungary the most. They have had to ask for IMF money because of rising deficits bringing 
the countries close to insolvency. 
 
4.3 Did easy liquidity contribute to boom-and-bust cycles? 
 
Thus far the paper has shown that easy EMU liquidity conditions transferred to CEE and 
provided signs of a possible overinvestment boom prior to the current bust. In this part the 
analysis follows Carilli and Dempster (2008) to test whether easy credit conditions caused the 
boom that endogenously led to a bust, using a polynomial distributed lag model.21 They show 
that a deviation of the money market from the natural rate in the United States increases GDP 
growth only for some periods, but in the long-run it causes a bust. 
 
                                                 
20 See Appendix B. 
21 A polynomial distributed lag model is chosen as the overinvestment theories suggest that the relationship 
between the deviation and growth is quadratic (Carilli and Dempster 2008). 
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PDL-models are first introduced in Almon (1965) and most prominently used in Anderson 
and Jordan (1968) and Batton and Thornton (1983). The advantage over estimating a VAR is 
that the model estimates only few coefficients although it includes many lags in the 
estimation and derives their coefficients in a second step. Thus, it allows for a calculation of 
the coefficients with many lags and relatively few observations.22  
 
Applying this technique to CEE, the lags of the deviation of the money market rate from the 
natural rate in CEE should explain the movements of industrial production. Here, more recent 
innovations in the interest rate should have a positive impact on growth, while more distant 
movements have a negative impact. The data in use remains the same. Granger causality tests 
verified the direction of transmission from the interest rate gap to the growth rates for all CEE 
economies. 
 
In Appendix B the results for each country are illustrated separately using 24 lags (two years) 
in Tables 3 to 12. This lag length brings about better values of the Schwartz criterion than 
shorter lag length. Although more lags improve the Schwartz values slightly, they lower the 
robustness of the estimates as the number of observations included in the regression shrinks. 
Further, the error term is white noise using 24 lags and the lag length corresponds to the 
widely acknowledged lagged impact of changes in the interest rate on inflation and output.  
 
Due to the lag length, the estimated coefficients feature the time period from January 2000 to 
December 2008.23 The output tables provide the estimated coefficients for Z  on top and the 
derived coefficients iβ  for each lagged gap in the tables on the bottom. The curves show the 
distribution of the lags.  A sign change of the coefficients iβ  from positive to negative 
indicates that a lower market than natural rate has a positive short-term impact on growth, 
while a bust will follow the boom in later periods. This provides evidence of a turning point 
endogenous to the gap (Carilli and Dempster 2008). 
 
The contemporaneous impact of the gap varies in the signs of the coefficients. But this impact 
is not significant for most economies. Only for Slovakia, Romania, Poland and Latvia there is 
a significant immediate effect. While this effect is positive for Slovakia, Latvia and Romania, 
it is negative for Poland. But for all countries the effect of a 3 to 4 lags of the gap is positive 
                                                 
22 For the calculation of second order PDL models see Appendix C. 
23 Different lag lengths do not change the results. 
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and significant. Thus, a deviation of the money market rate from the natural rate has a 
positive effect on growth after 3 to 4 months.  
 
Further, the exchange rate regime does not play a role for inducing boom-and-bust cycles due 
to a deviation of the market and the natural rate. However, the explanatory power is the 
highest for countries with hard pegs such as Estonia, Bulgaria and Latvia. Furthermore, the 
explanatory power of the regression is relatively high for Poland and Hungary (see Appendix 
D). For different lag lengths also the explanatory power for Romania and Lithuania is high. 
This signals that a deviation from the natural rate contributed to boom-and-bust-cycles in 
these countries. 
 
 
5 Economic policy implications 
 
This paper has focused on explaining how overinvestment due to easy liquidity conditions in 
the EMU and buoyant (foreign) credit growth can emerge in the small open economies of 
CEE. The empirical analysis has provided evidence in favor of a liquidity transmission from 
the EMU to CEE. At the same time there are some signs of a credit boom prior to the current 
crisis. This may signal overinvestment in the sense of the augmented Mises-Hayek theory 
which may have endogenously (by itself) led to the cyclical downturn. 
 
Even though there is not a full insurance against speculation and false risk assessment, to 
lower the probability of economic turmoil in the future and cope with the current crisis the 
following policy implications arise from the paper: 
 
First, as outlined by the overinvestment theory, the money market rate has to be close to its 
natural rate to reduce the risk of overinvestment cycles in the EMU and CEE, respectively. 
Thus, credit creation (banking sector) has to be brought under control by improved risk 
assessment and supervision. From this perspective, the current measures for a better 
supervision of the banking sector and the ECB paying attention to monetary aggregates 
provide hope for the future. But as credit creation may increase even without additional 
money supply from the central bank, future monetary policy models could consider taking 
into account asset prices and credit aggregates (Borio 2008), or departing from assumptions 
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of perfect information of the banking sector (Lombari and Sgherri 2007) to improve the 
prediction of future natural rates and keep credit conditions under control.  
 
Second, from Mises’s and Hayek’s point of view, policy-induced credit expansions are not 
adequate to counteract a crisis as they delay the structural adjustment and prevent the 
reallocation of resources. Likewise, the events during the Asian crisis and following the dot-
com bubble show that expansionary fiscal and monetary policies may cause moral hazard of 
the private sector, new distortions and new overinvestment cycles (Saxena and Wong 2002, 
Schnabl and Hoffmann 2008). In this sense, the current Bundesbank/ECB strategy is 
promising as it seems to acknowledge these findings. For instance, Jürgen Stark (member of 
the executive board of the ECB) recently announced that “the financial crisis can’t be solved 
with rate cuts” and “the lower rates are the less incentive banks have to clean up their balance 
sheets and carefully monitor their credit risks” (Bloomberg 2009). Furthermore, Axel Weber 
(2008) argues that in the future liquidity conditions have to be restricted as they were 
loosened in the crisis (more symmetrically than before) to lower the probability of new 
bubbles or inflation. 
 
Third, as the CEE countries with floating exchange rates have seen strong depreciations in the 
current crisis, exchange rate stabilizers should keep the peg to prevent their economy from 
further credit defaults. The IMF further promotes a fast euro adoption (The Baltic Times 
2009). Instead of depreciating the countries’ currencies, as widely suggested following the 
Asian crisis, wages should be reduced to adjust to the new situation and to regain 
competitiveness as currently done in Estonia. 
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Appendix A 
Figure 1: Capital Flows from EMU to CEE 
 
Source: Own drawing. 
 
Figure 2: Interest rates in the euro area, Poland, Estonia and Romania: 1995-2008 
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Figure 3: Foreign liabilities of banks in Poland, Estonia and Romania: 1995-2008 
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Figure 4: Lending-deposit rate spread in Poland, Estonia and Romania: 1995-2008 
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Table 1: Granger Causality of the interest rate gaps in the EMU and CEE 
Causality relation tested Obs. (lags) F-statistics Prob. 
EMU gap do not GC BU gap  
BU gap do not GC EMU gap 
131 
(2 lags) 
2.745 
4.172 
0.069* 
0.019** 
EMU gap do not GC CZ gap 
CZ gap do not GC EMU gap 
129 
(2 lags) 
8.371 
0.231 
0.000*** 
0.794 
EMU gap do not GC EE gap 
EE gap do not GC EMU gap 
129 
(2 lags) 
10.245 
0.276 
0.000*** 
0.759 
EMU gap do not GC HU gap 
HU gap do not GC EMU gap 
128 
(2 lags) 
2.429 
0.022 
0.092* 
0.978 
EMU gap do not GC LT gap 
LT gap do not GC EMU gap 
128 
(2 lags) 
0.797 
0.883 
0.453*** 
0.416 
EMU gap do not GC LV gap 
LV gap do not GC EMU gap 
128 
(2 lags) 
1.135 
1.273 
0.325*** 
0.284 
EMU gap do not GC PL gap 
PL gap do not GC EMU gap 
129 
(2 lags) 
15.295 
0.243 
0.000*** 
0.785 
EMU gap do not GC SI gap 
SI gap do not GC EMU gap 
129 
(2 lags) 
7.516 
0.201 
0.000*** 
0.818 
EMU gap do not GC SK gap 
SK gap do not GC EMU gap 
129 
(2 lags) 
0.186 
0.246 
0.830 
0.782 
EMU gap do not GC RO gap 
RO gap do not GC EMU gap 
129 
(2 lags) 
0.148 
0.695 
0.865 
0.501 
***, ** and * indicate levels of significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. As Granger causality is also found 
for Latvia and Lithuania after 2001, *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level (after 2001).  
 
Table 2: Granger causality of EMU rates and Rates in NMS 
Money market rates Obs F-statistics Prob. 
EMU rates do not GC EE rates 
EE rates do not GC EMU rates 
131 
(2 lags) 
6.147 
0.329 
0.003*** 
0.720 
EMU rates do not GC BU rates  
BU rates do not GC EMU rates 
131 
(2 lags) 
6.974 
0.605 
0.001*** 
0.548 
EMU rates do not GC CZ rates 
CZ rates do not GC EMU rates 
132 
(2 lags) 
2.450 
0.015 
0.090* 
0.985 
EMU rates do not GC HU rates 
HU rates do not GC EMU rates 
132 
(2 lags) 
5.689 
2.620 
0.000*** 
0.077* 
EMU rates do not GC LT rates 
LT rates do not GC EMU rates 
131 
(2 lags) 
0.685 
0.055 
0.506 
0.946 
EMU rates do not GC LV rates 
LV rates do not GC EMU rates 
131 
(2 lags) 
7.220 
1.493 
0.001*** 
0.229 
EMU rates do not GC PL rates 
PL rates do not GC EMU rates 
132 
(3 lags) 
10.010 
1.798 
0.000*** 
0.151 
EMU rates do not GC SK rates 
SK rates do not GC EMU rates 
131 
(2 lags) 
0.050 
1.491 
0.951 
0.229 
EMU rates do not GC SI rates 
SI rates do not GC EMU rates 
132 
(2 lags) 
0.430 
0.204 
0.651 
0.816 
EMU rates do not GC RO rates 
RO rates do not GC EMU rates 
131 
(2 lags) 
0.897 
3.407 
0.410 
0.036** 
The lags used are taken from the Schwartz test. For more lags as suggested by the Akaike criterion, the results 
remain unchanged and significance improves. The Slovakian interest rate is then Granger caused by the EMU 
rate. Lithuanian and Slovenian interest rates are Granger caused by EMU rates after 2001. But no causality can 
be found between the EMU and the Romanian interest rates.  
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Appendix B 
Figure 5: Credit to the private sector/ assets in Poland, Estonia and Romania: 1995-2008 
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Source: IMF, IFS 2009. PL, EE and RO represent the different exchange rate strategies of the 
CEE. 
 
Figure 6: Development of the banks’ credit-deposit ratio in CEE and Germany 
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Source: World Bank, 2009. 
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Figure 7: Credit to the private sector/ GDP in Poland, Estonia and Romania: 1998-2008 
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Source: IFS, 2009. PL, EE and RO represent the different exchange rate strategies of the 
CEE. 
 
Figure 8: Asset prices in Poland, Estonia and Romania: 1998-2008 
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Source: IMF, IFS 2009. Share prices. PL, EE and RO represent the different exchange rate 
strategies of the CEE. 
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Figure 9: Investment in percent of GDP: 1998-2008 
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Source: Eurostat, 2009. 
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Figure 10: Money/GDP in Poland, Estonia and Romania: 1998-2008 
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Source: IMF, IFS 2009. PL, EE and RO represent the different exchange rate strategies of the 
CEE. 
 
Figure 11: Foreign exchange reserves in CEE: 1994-2008 
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Source: IMF, IFS 2009. Averages represent different exchange rate regimes. 
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Figure 12: Real appreciation in CEE 1994-2008 
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Source: IMF, IFS 2009. Averages represent countries with rather flexible and fixed exchange 
rate regimes. 
 
Figure 13: Composite credit boom index for CEE 
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Source: IMF, IFS 2009. Average index for the CEE of investment/GDP, money/ GDP and 
asset price development from the hp-trend. 
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Figure 14: Credit boom components and deviations from trend 
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Source: IMF, IFS 2009. Average index for the CEE of investment/GDP, money/ GDP and 
asset price development from the hp-trend. 
 
Figure 15: Inflation in CEE and Germany 1994-2008 
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Source: IMF, IFS 2009. Averages represent rather flexible or fixed exchange rate regimes. 
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Table 3: Bulgaria 
Sample (adjusted): 2003M01 2008M11  
Included observations: 71 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.090914  0.005934 15.32133 0.0000 
PDL01 0.066145  0.019353 3.417778 0.0011 
PDL02 -0.005666  0.000960 -5.904112 0.0000 
PDL03 -0.001024  0.000366 -2.799115 0.0067 
R-squared 0.498509    
Lag Distribution of 
BU_GAP  i Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
           *.     |  0 -0.01333  0.03516 -0.37920 
            *     |  1  0.00456  0.02700  0.16879 
            .*    |  2  0.02040  0.01971  1.03492 
            . *   |  3  0.03419  0.01346  2.53932 
            .  *  |  4  0.04593  0.00878  5.23253 
            .   * |  5  0.05563  0.00698  7.97028 
            .   * |  6  0.06327  0.00851  7.43803 
            .    *|  7  0.06887  0.01129  6.10266 
            .    *|  8  0.07242  0.01401  5.16951 
            .    *|  9  0.07393  0.01627  4.54250 
            .    *|  10  0.07338  0.01795  4.08874 
            .    *|  11  0.07079  0.01898  3.72982 
            .   * |  12  0.06614  0.01935  3.41778 
            .   * |  13  0.05945  0.01907  3.11719 
            .  *  |  14  0.05072  0.01816  2.79292 
            .  *  |  15  0.03993  0.01666  2.39713 
            . *   |  16  0.02709  0.01467  1.84696 
            .*    |  17  0.01221  0.01243  0.98263 
           *.     |  18 -0.00472  0.01048 -0.45035 
          * .     |  19 -0.02370  0.00997 -2.37792 
         *  .     |  20 -0.04473  0.01200 -3.72728 
       *    .     |  21 -0.06780  0.01638 -4.14041 
     *      .     |  22 -0.09293  0.02235 -4.15840 
   *        .     |  23 -0.12010  0.02947 -4.07555 
 *          .     |  24 -0.14932  0.03754 -3.97781 
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Table 4: Czech Republic 
Sample (adjusted): 2000M01 2008M11  
Included observations: 107 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.057683  0.005357 10.76792 0.0000 
PDL01 0.088465  0.024071 3.675261 0.0004 
PDL02 -0.003954  0.001220 -3.241821 0.0016 
PDL03 -0.001211  0.000434 -2.791332 0.0063 
R-squared 0.256027    
Lag Distribution of 
CZ_GAP  i Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
        *  .      |  0 -0.03852  0.04314 -0.89297 
          *.      |  1 -0.01461  0.03361 -0.43486 
           *      |  2  0.00687  0.02523  0.27227 
           .*     |  3  0.02593  0.01831  1.41646 
           .  *   |  4  0.04257  0.01347  3.16024 
           .   *  |  5  0.05679  0.01170  4.85322 
           .   *  |  6  0.06858  0.01294  5.30164 
           .    * |  7  0.07795  0.01559  4.99995 
           .    * |  8  0.08490  0.01841  4.61145 
           .     *|  9  0.08943  0.02084  4.29069 
           .     *|  10  0.09153  0.02265  4.04017 
           .     *|  11  0.09121  0.02375  3.84082 
           .     *|  12  0.08847  0.02407  3.67526 
           .    * |  13  0.08330  0.02360  3.52926 
           .    * |  14  0.07571  0.02234  3.38938 
           .   *  |  15  0.06570  0.02029  3.23851 
           .  *   |  16  0.05327  0.01749  3.04567 
           . *    |  17  0.03841  0.01405  2.73370 
           .*     |  18  0.02113  0.01031  2.04992 
           *      |  19  0.00143  0.00755  0.18953 
         * .      |  20 -0.02069  0.00887 -2.33333 
       *   .      |  21 -0.04524  0.01431 -3.16052 
     *     .      |  22 -0.07221  0.02177 -3.31726 
   *       .      |  23 -0.10160  0.03047 -3.33499 
 *         .      |  24 -0.13342  0.04019 -3.31992 
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Table 5: Estonia 
Sample (adjusted): 2000M01 2008M11  
Included observations: 107 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.087384  0.005560 15.71777 0.0000 
PDL01 0.071656  0.022896 3.129556 0.0023 
PDL02 -0.007556  0.000778 -9.706043 0.0000 
PDL03 -0.001064  0.000416 -2.559971 0.0119 
R-squared 0.582446    
Lag Distribution of                
EE_GAP  i Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
            *     |  0  0.00911  0.03886  0.23443 
            .*    |  1  0.02603  0.02941  0.88490 
            . *   |  2  0.04082  0.02090  1.95279 
            .  *  |  3  0.05348  0.01349  3.96471 
            .   * |  4  0.06401  0.00779  8.21420 
            .   * |  5  0.07241  0.00615  11.7753 
            .    *|  6  0.07869  0.00905  8.69370 
            .    *|  7  0.08284  0.01288  6.43119 
            .    *|  8  0.08486  0.01633  5.19540 
            .    *|  9  0.08475  0.01912  4.43193 
            .    *|  10  0.08251  0.02116  3.89884 
            .    *|  11  0.07815  0.02242  3.48486 
            .   * |  12  0.07166  0.02290  3.12956 
            .   * |  13  0.06304  0.02258  2.79203 
            .  *  |  14  0.05229  0.02148  2.43479 
            . *   |  15  0.03941  0.01961  2.00948 
            .*    |  16  0.02441  0.01704  1.43243 
            *     |  17  0.00728  0.01388  0.52435 
           *.     |  18 -0.01198  0.01047 -1.14430 
          * .     |  19 -0.03337  0.00803 -4.15698 
        *   .     |  20 -0.05689  0.00914 -6.22324 
       *    .     |  21 -0.08253  0.01407 -5.86630 
     *      .     |  22 -0.11030  0.02104 -5.24301 
   *        .     |  23 -0.14021  0.02927 -4.78986 
 *          .     |  24 -0.17223  0.03852 -4.47119 
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Table 6: Hungary 
Sample (adjusted): 2000M01 2008M10  
Included observations: 106 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.063937  0.017653 3.621866 0.0005 
PDL01 0.056664  0.018969 2.987158 0.0035 
PDL02 -0.006112  0.001360 -4.493761 0.0000 
PDL03 -0.001131  0.000378 -2.995171 0.0034 
R-squared 0.244316    
Lag Distribution of 
HU_GAP  i Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
           * .    |  0 -0.03288  0.04341 -0.75739 
            *.    |  1 -0.01298  0.03505 -0.37026 
             *    |  2  0.00467  0.02765  0.16877 
             .*   |  3  0.02005  0.02138  0.93772 
             . *  |  4  0.03317  0.01650  2.00941 
             .  * |  5  0.04402  0.01345  3.27321 
             .  * |  6  0.05261  0.01249  4.21237 
             .   *|  7  0.05895  0.01322  4.45777 
             .   *|  8  0.06301  0.01476  4.26951 
             .   *|  9  0.06482  0.01640  3.95349 
             .   *|  10  0.06436  0.01775  3.62590 
             .   *|  11  0.06164  0.01864  3.30740 
             .  * |  12  0.05666  0.01897  2.98716 
             .  * |  13  0.04942  0.01871  2.64175 
             . *  |  14  0.03991  0.01785  2.23551 
             . *  |  15  0.02815  0.01645  1.71069 
             .*   |  16  0.01412  0.01461  0.96596 
             *    |  17 -0.00218  0.01259 -0.17293 
           * .    |  18 -0.02073  0.01097 -1.88952 
          *  .    |  19 -0.04155  0.01083 -3.83821 
         *   .    |  20 -0.06463  0.01306 -4.95033 
       *     .    |  21 -0.08997  0.01747 -5.15076 
     *       .    |  22 -0.11758  0.02344 -5.01545 
   *         .    |  23 -0.14745  0.03059 -4.82041 
 *           .    |  24 -0.17958  0.03871 -4.63905 
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Table 7: Lithuania 
Sample (adjusted): 2000M01 2008M11  
Included observations: 107 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.081625  0.010081 8.096662 0.0000 
PDL01 0.014805  0.067640 0.218884 0.8272 
PDL02 -0.005055  0.002057 -2.456885 0.0157 
PDL03 -7.87E-05  0.001364 -0.057707 0.9541 
R-squared 0.099139    
Lag Distribution of 
LT_GAP  i Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
         .       *|  0  0.06413  0.12317  0.52063 
         .       *|  1  0.06088  0.09275  0.65645 
         .      * |  2  0.05748  0.06525  0.88094 
         .      * |  3  0.05392  0.04100  1.31530 
         .     *  |  4  0.05021  0.02140  2.34610 
         .     *  |  5  0.04633  0.01486  3.11849 
         .    *   |  6  0.04230  0.02540  1.66539 
         .    *   |  7  0.03811  0.03810  1.00019 
         .   *    |  8  0.03377  0.04906  0.68829 
         .  *     |  9  0.02926  0.05761  0.50791 
         .  *     |  10  0.02460  0.06359  0.38683 
         . *      |  11  0.01978  0.06694  0.29549 
         . *      |  12  0.01481  0.06764  0.21888 
         .*       |  13  0.00967  0.06568  0.14726 
         *        |  14  0.00438  0.06108  0.07172 
        *.        |  15 -0.00107  0.05389 -0.01981 
        *.        |  16 -0.00667  0.04424 -0.15084 
       * .        |  17 -0.01244  0.03251 -0.38252 
      *  .        |  18 -0.01836  0.02039 -0.90031 
     *   .        |  19 -0.02444  0.01703 -1.43453 
     *   .        |  20 -0.03067  0.03133 -0.97892 
    *    .        |  21 -0.03707  0.05326 -0.69594 
   *     .        |  22 -0.04362  0.07903 -0.55190 
  *      .        |  23 -0.05032  0.10791 -0.46636 
 *       .        |  24 -0.05719  0.13969 -0.40941 
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Table 8: Latvia 
Sample (adjusted): 2000M01 2008M10  
Included observations: 106 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.008406  0.014269 0.589084 0.5571 
PDL01 -0.126194  0.034927 -3.613058 0.0005 
PDL02 -0.015408  0.001875 -8.215840 0.0000 
PDL03 0.002143  0.000671 3.191882 0.0019 
R-squared 0.476287    
Lag Distribution of 
LV_GAP  i Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
      .          *|  0  0.36727  0.06327  5.80506 
      .        *  |  1  0.30258  0.04828  6.26710 
      .      *    |  2  0.24217  0.03484  6.95146 
      .    *      |  3  0.18605  0.02321  8.01675 
      .   *       |  4  0.13421  0.01430  9.38480 
      . *         |  5  0.08666  0.01100  7.88015 
      .*          |  6  0.04340  0.01443  3.00771 
      *           |  7  0.00442  0.01993  0.22164 
     *.           |  8 -0.03028  0.02511 -1.20570 
    * .           |  9 -0.06068  0.02933 -2.06889 
   *  .           |  10 -0.08681  0.03241 -2.67834 
   *  .           |  11 -0.10864  0.03428 -3.16915 
  *   .           |  12 -0.12619  0.03493 -3.61306 
  *   .           |  13 -0.13946  0.03436 -4.05887 
 *    .           |  14 -0.14844  0.03262 -4.55068 
 *    .           |  15 -0.15313  0.02980 -5.13899 
 *    .           |  16 -0.15354  0.02609 -5.88442 
 *    .           |  17 -0.14967  0.02196 -6.81691 
  *   .           |  18 -0.14150  0.01848 -7.65616 
  *   .           |  19 -0.12906  0.01790 -7.20885 
  *   .           |  20 -0.11232  0.02215 -5.07173 
   *  .           |  21 -0.09130  0.03056 -2.98736 
    * .           |  22 -0.06600  0.04177 -1.58003 
     *.           |  23 -0.03641  0.05502 -0.66179 
      *           |  24 -0.00253  0.06996 -0.03620 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 42
Table 9: Poland 
Sample (adjusted): 2000M01 2008M11  
Included observations: 107 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.073779  0.005889 12.52906 0.0000 
PDL01 0.081836  0.013101 6.246566 0.0000 
PDL02 -0.003217  0.000810 -3.973405 0.0001 
PDL03 -0.001374  0.000255 -5.386705 0.0000 
R-squared 0.434181    
Lag Distribution of 
PL_GAP  i Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
      *    .      |  0 -0.07740  0.02635 -2.93727 
        *  .      |  1 -0.04901  0.02065 -2.37312 
          *.      |  2 -0.02338  0.01559 -1.49985 
           *      |  3 -0.00049  0.01127 -0.04382 
           . *    |  4  0.01964  0.00798  2.46170 
           .  *   |  5  0.03704  0.00629  5.88624 
           .   *  |  6  0.05168  0.00655  7.89088 
           .    * |  7  0.06357  0.00796  7.98978 
           .    * |  8  0.07272  0.00960  7.57635 
           .     *|  9  0.07912  0.01105  7.15778 
           .     *|  10  0.08277  0.01216  6.80651 
           .     *|  11  0.08368  0.01285  6.51050 
           .     *|  12  0.08184  0.01310  6.24657 
           .     *|  13  0.07725  0.01290  5.99018 
           .    * |  14  0.06991  0.01224  5.71153 
           .   *  |  15  0.05982  0.01115  5.36344 
           .   *  |  16  0.04699  0.00969  4.85068 
           . *    |  17  0.03141  0.00796  3.94305 
           .*     |  18  0.01308  0.00633  2.06474 
           *      |  19 -0.00800  0.00568 -1.40793 
         * .      |  20 -0.03183  0.00707 -4.50022 
        *  .      |  21 -0.05840  0.01024 -5.70342 
      *    .      |  22 -0.08772  0.01449 -6.05443 
    *      .      |  23 -0.11979  0.01949 -6.14554 
 *         .      |  24 -0.15460  0.02512 -6.15395 
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Table 10: Romania 
Sample (adjusted): 2000M01 2008M11  
Included observations: 107 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.037829  0.007127 5.307524 0.0000 
PDL01 0.000562  0.004995 0.112485 0.9107 
PDL02 -0.002225  0.000690 -3.226844 0.0017 
PDL03 2.21E-05  0.000103 0.213952 0.8310 
R-squared 0.153912    
Lag Distribution of 
RO_GAP  i Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
        .        *|  0  0.03045  0.01582  1.92502 
        .       * |  1  0.02772  0.01325  2.09155 
        .      *  |  2  0.02503  0.01093  2.29041 
        .      *  |  3  0.02238  0.00886  2.52563 
        .     *   |  4  0.01978  0.00709  2.79127 
        .    *    |  5  0.01722  0.00565  3.04841 
        .   *     |  6  0.01471  0.00462  3.18298 
        .   *     |  7  0.01224  0.00406  3.01318 
        .  *      |  8  0.00982  0.00395  2.48612 
        . *       |  9  0.00744  0.00414  1.79798 
        .*        |  10  0.00510  0.00445  1.14644 
        .*        |  11  0.00281  0.00476  0.59017 
        *         |  12  0.00056  0.00500  0.11249 
       *.         |  13 -0.00164  0.00512 -0.32074 
       *.         |  14 -0.00380  0.00511 -0.74337 
      * .         |  15 -0.00592  0.00498 -1.18722 
      * .         |  16 -0.00799  0.00475 -1.68227 
     *  .         |  17 -0.01001  0.00445 -2.24980 
    *   .         |  18 -0.01199  0.00418 -2.87289 
    *   .         |  19 -0.01393  0.00406 -3.43362 
   *    .         |  20 -0.01583  0.00427 -3.70835 
   *    .         |  21 -0.01768  0.00492 -3.58997 
  *     .         |  22 -0.01948  0.00603 -3.23020 
  *     .         |  23 -0.02124  0.00753 -2.82153 
 *      .         |  24 -0.02296  0.00935 -2.45443 
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Table 11: Slovenia 
Sample (adjusted): 2000M01 2008M11  
Included observations: 107 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.045796  0.009703 4.719696 0.0000 
PDL01 0.081662  0.035396 2.307112 0.0230 
PDL02 -0.003975  0.001552 -2.561125 0.0119 
PDL03 -0.001455  0.000713 -2.039625 0.0439 
R-squared 0.120534    
Lag Distribution of SI_GAP  i Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
       *    .     |  0 -0.08015  0.06559 -1.22202 
         *  .     |  1 -0.05066  0.04992 -1.01494 
          * .     |  2 -0.02408  0.03590 -0.67076 
            *     |  3 -0.00041  0.02386 -0.01733 
            .*    |  4  0.02035  0.01482  1.37331 
            . *   |  5  0.03819  0.01181  3.23547 
            .  *  |  6  0.05313  0.01551  3.42564 
            .   * |  7  0.06516  0.02115  3.08173 
            .   * |  8  0.07428  0.02637  2.81745 
            .    *|  9  0.08049  0.03055  2.63520 
            .    *|  10  0.08379  0.03349  2.50227 
            .    *|  11  0.08418  0.03511  2.39743 
            .    *|  12  0.08166  0.03540  2.30711 
            .   * |  13  0.07623  0.03433  2.22081 
            .   * |  14  0.06789  0.03192  2.12716 
            .  *  |  15  0.05664  0.02821  2.00801 
            . *   |  16  0.04248  0.02331  1.82272 
            .*    |  17  0.02541  0.01753  1.44961 
            *     |  18  0.00544  0.01210  0.44927 
           *.     |  19 -0.01745  0.01143 -1.52655 
         *  .     |  20 -0.04325  0.01853 -2.33475 
       *    .     |  21 -0.07196  0.02964 -2.42760 
      *     .     |  22 -0.10358  0.04295 -2.41184 
   *        .     |  23 -0.13811  0.05796 -2.38274 
 *          .     |  24 -0.17555  0.07454 -2.35513 
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Table 12: Slovakia 
Sample (adjusted): 2000M01 2008M11  
Included observations: 107 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.088496  0.007238 12.22646 0.0000 
PDL01 -0.014479  0.011392 -1.271007 0.2066 
PDL02 0.000867  0.000863 1.005340 0.3171 
PDL03 0.000545  0.000237 2.296676 0.0237 
R-squared 0.115291    
Lag Distribution of 
SK_GAP  i Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
    .        *    |  0  0.05358  0.02552  2.09913 
    .      *      |  1  0.04191  0.02030  2.06419 
    .    *        |  2  0.03134  0.01567  1.99937 
    .   *         |  3  0.02185  0.01173  1.86366 
    . *           |  4  0.01346  0.00866  1.55429 
    .*            |  5  0.00615  0.00683  0.90056 
    *             |  6 -6.6E-05  0.00652 -0.01018 
   *.             |  7 -0.00519  0.00733 -0.70877 
  * .             |  8 -0.00923  0.00854 -1.08082 
  * .             |  9 -0.01218  0.00970 -1.25487 
 *  .             |  10 -0.01403  0.01062 -1.32192 
 *  .             |  11 -0.01480  0.01119 -1.32263 
 *  .             |  12 -0.01448  0.01139 -1.27101 
  * .             |  13 -0.01307  0.01121 -1.16554 
  * .             |  14 -0.01056  0.01066 -0.99078 
   *.             |  15 -0.00697  0.00979 -0.71206 
   *.             |  16 -0.00229  0.00870 -0.26340 
    *             |  17  0.00348  0.00761  0.45729 
    . *           |  18  0.01034  0.00697  1.48343 
    .  *          |  19  0.01829  0.00743  2.46025 
    .    *        |  20  0.02733  0.00932  2.93400 
    .     *       |  21  0.03746  0.01238  3.02583 
    .       *     |  22  0.04868  0.01632  2.98311 
    .          *  |  23  0.06099  0.02095  2.91176 
    .            *|  24  0.07439  0.02617  2.84264 
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Appendix C 
 
The PDL-model 
 
The lag-model for the CEE economies is specified as follows: Real growth in industrial 
production gˆ is a function of the deviation of the natural from the real interest rate in CEE 
tX . 
 
∑
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Assuming  iβ  to be a second degree polynomial (j=2) as in Carilli and Dempster (2008) 
brings about the following second order polynomial: 
 
2
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at lag length i. Thus, 
oa=0β         
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Replacing 0β  to kβ  in the growth equations brings about: 
 
tktttt XkakaaXaaaXag εα +++++++++= −− *)**(...*)(ˆ 221012100   
or  
    
tktttktttktttt XkXXakXXXaXXXag εα +++++++++++++= −−−−−− )...1()...1()...(ˆ 2121110
 
Then the parameters are substituted by the variables Z, which leads to the regression: 
 
ttttt ZaZaZag εα ++++= 221100ˆ    (3)   
with 
kttttt XXXXZ −−− ++++= ...210       
kttttt kXXXXZ −−− ++++= ...21 211      
kttttt XkXXXZ −−− ++++= 2212 ...41      
 
In 4.2 equation (3) is estimated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
